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Polarization:  The Tea Party Movement’s Effect on Congressional Roll Call Voting
The Tea Party movement is the most recent example of a faction 
rising from within an American political party.  It rose unexpectedly, and it 
is hard to predict where it will end.  It is important to get inside the heads 
of incumbent Congressmen to see how they deal with events like the rise of 
a faction within a two party system.  This study analyzes roll call voting 
ideology scores of both Democrat and Republican incumbents to see just 
how the presence of the Tea Party caused a change from the 111th Congress 
to the 112th Congress.  I find that the presence of the Tea Party seems to 
have a positive influence on roll call voting ideology, effectively pushing the 
parties further apart on the traditional liberal-conservative spectrum of 
ideology.  Due to low sample sizes, this unfortunately cannot be said with 
statistical certainty.  It is clear by the end that the Tea Party, as a faction 
attempting to change the status quo, further separated the two parties.  
This was due to the Republican Party’s need to assume the movement to 
ensure they remained Republicans.  In a sort of reactionary force, the 
Democratic Party has been able to become more liberal in the face of 
extreme opponents and still retain the median voter all Representatives 
seek.
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In 2010, one of the most popular subjects for people in the political realm was the 
exact classification of the Tea Party.  This grassroots movement, focusing on primarily 
economic concerns, seemingly rose out of nothingness with no central leadership and no 
strict platform of.  Political entities like Michelle Bachmann, who formed the Tea Party 
Caucus, have helped direct this new movement, yet the Tea Party has maintained little 
autonomy since its inception and has become increasingly intertwined with the 
Republican Party.  This recent evolution of the Tea Party within the Republican Party has 
caused many political scientists to question the effect it has had on the ideological base, 
measured by roll call voting patterns, of Representatives in Congress.  The work on this 
thesis aims toward proposing solutions to a few of these questions with regards to the 
effects of facing more extreme factional candidates on incumbents.  These questions are 
important to ask because they provide a basis for what may be occurring in the U.S. 
Congress with an increasingly partisan divide and little room in the middle for moderate 
members of Congress, along with clear anti-compromise sentiments.  By providing 
possible solutions to the proposed questions, the Tea Party’s influence, and inner-party 
factions influences on the party as a whole, may become clearer.
My opinion, which other scholarly research in the past has supported, is that in 
order to maintain elected office, one must access the “median voter." In general elections 
this voter can be seen closer to the ideological middle, that is, somewhere between the 
Democratic and the Republican parties.  The median voter changes in primaries, however, 
when an incumbent faces opposition from within his own party.  The “median voter” for 
primary elections, therefore, is typically more extreme on the ideological spectrum than 
that of the general election.  After these primary elections, I believe that incumbents who 
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are victorious will become more ideologically extreme to ensure their success in future 
primary elections within their own party through the idea of “uptake”, the consuming of
their opponents ideas and standpoints.  This is especially prevalent in the case of the Tea 
Party movement because the rise of the faction within the Republican Party lends itself to 
a certain set of beliefs and ideas that allow Republican incumbents an easy way to identify 
ways to obtain those votes that did not go their way in the previous election cycle.  In line 
with the idea of the “median voter”, Democrats may be seen undertaking a similar, yet 
opposite, form of “uptake.” I call this term “reverse uptake” because their opponents shift 
to one end of the ideological spectrum, meaning that they may be able to do the same and 
take up issues that previously would have labeled them too liberal to attain the median 
voter. Previous studies have shown that there is not likely a link between the Tea Party 
and overall ideology in Congress, but this study aims to analyze specific contests and 
testing the ideology of specific Congressional incumbents.
This study asks, “How does the presence of Tea Party endorsed candidates affect 
incumbent members of Congress?” I test three hypotheses:
1. Democrat members of Congress who face Tea Party opposition in the general 
election will shift to a more liberal voting pattern in roll call voting ideology.
2. Republican members of Congress who are not contested by Tea Party 
candidates but represent a state with a strong Tea Party base will become more 
conservative with regards to roll call voting ideology.
3. Senators up for reelection in 2012, following the rise of the Tea Party in 2010, 
will preemptively change their voting ideology in anticipation.  Democrat 
Senators will become more liberal and Republican Senators more conservative.
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To test my hypotheses, I will take a look at primary elections that took place for the 
112th Congress, in 2010.  Using Keith Poole’s measurement system called "DW-
NOMINATE," which gauges incumbent’s ideological stance by their voting record to take a 
look at the ideological stance following 111th Congress for incumbents, I will then 
compare that with their ideological stances following the 112th Congress to see if a shift 
occurred following either party's primary experience.  To ensure that specific incumbents 
were affected by their primary contests in 2010, I control various variables such as 
seniority and the amount of money raised during the election cycle, along with the 
closeness of the election to determine how that affects change in ideology as well. I may 
find that shifts exist in non-competitive general election districts rather than competitive 
ones because the acquisition of the median voter for the general election is much easier 
and less important than the median voter of the primary election.
After testing my hypotheses, I expect to find that Republican incumbents who ran 
for reelection in states with a strong Tea Party presence will show a more conservative 
voting record following their electoral contest.  The reasoning behind this idea is the 
notion that politicians constantly strive for reelection. This goal, combined with the 
pressure that the Tea Party candidate puts on the incumbent in the primary, means that 
the incumbent will absorb, or “uptake,” some of the Tea Party candidates' ideas to shift 
their ideological stance more towards the Republican “median voter,” and thus more 
conservative in general, to ensure future electoral success, especially in primary elections.  
The same basic reasoning lies behind the second hypothesis regarding Democratic 
incumbents against Tea Party members.  The Tea Party is traditionally more conservative
than many Republicans, thus Democratic candidates can become more liberal themselves, 
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creating a balancing effort that allows them to use “reverse uptake” to still maintain the 
median voter, but better represent their possible “true” ideological position. It is
important to consider the idea of competitiveness, and it may be the case that incumbents 
who barely win reelection will only slightly change their voting ideology, if at all.  Moving 
toward one of the ideological extremes would only alienate a candidate who barely won 
the last election from his median voter. 
Literature Review
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of factions within parties, in this 
case, Tea Party challengers during the 2010 midterm election.  When trying to understand 
the intricate nature of political ideology with regards to roll call voting in the United 
States Congress, it is important to look at past research to gain a strong foothold on the 
subject.
The Median Voter
Not every election is created equal.  It is important to consider the electoral 
context of each election rather than simply assuming that each is similar in a variety of 
aspects.  If a Democrat is running for office in a strictly liberal district, then the general 
election is secondary to the primary election in importance.  The same is true for 
Republican candidates in strictly conservative districts.  In more moderate, or slightly 
learning districts, primary elections maintain their importance, while at the same time the 
general election becomes an issue.  It is the duty of a candidate to weigh his options and 
find a happy ideological medium with which he can attempt to win his party’s primary, 
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and still be contentious in the general election.  This creates concerns in which it may be 
in the best interest of a candidate to absorb more ideologically extreme ideas to maintain 
position in their own party.  However, doing so may harm his prospects of winning the 
general election.
It is the overarching goal of elected officials to maintain that elected status, 
whether for selfish reasons like prestige and wealth, or for more altruistic ones like the 
promotion of a particular social policy that they believe in.  To obtain this end goal, they
must constantly strive for an increase in the vote share of their electorate.  This results in 
the idea of obtaining a “median voter” (Downs 1957), the exact point in the ideological 
spectrum present where one party, if all actors are rational, can expect to obtain 50 
percent of the vote plus one.  In general elections this “median voter” lies somewhere in 
the ideological middle, maintaining a more moderate position when using the traditional 
liberal-conservative spectrum.  One can think of this as a sort of centripetal force that 
pulls candidates inward towards positions that best promote their re-election chances.  
The “median voter” phenomenon is also present in primary elections where candidates 
vie from within their own party for the nomination to the general election.  This creates a 
problem for candidates, as primary voters are typically more ideologically extreme, and 
catering to them would pull their position further from the median voter in the general 
election.  Thus, though a centripetal force is exuded on candidates in the general election, 
this may be balanced by a centrifugal force that is put in place by party primaries (Burden 
2004).   
These party primaries are dominated by the politically active, who tend to be more 
ideologically extreme than the average member of the party (Burden 2004). The rise of 
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the Tea Party movement for the 2010 midterm elections placed pressure on incumbents 
and other primary candidates, as candidates identifying with the Tea Party were in 
general much more conservative than their Republican peers (Abramowitz 2011).  
Studies have concluded that the Tea Party was a polarizing movement during the 2010
midterm elections (Aldrich, Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, and Rohde 2012).  These two 
concepts go hand in hand with one another, politically active primary voters combined 
with extreme candidates.  For example, in the 2010 midterm Senatorial election in Utah, 
incumbent Robert F. Bennett was seeking his fourth term, yet the state convention 
became strongly aligned with the Tea Party, with 86% of the convention members saying 
they viewed the movement “favorably”.  Senator Bennett, who did not align himself with 
the Tea Party, did not make it past the second round of the state convention voting, and 
only got a majority vote with the small proportion of the convention population who 
viewed the Tea Party “unfavorably” (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope 2011).  The 
rise in support of these more extreme conservative candidates from the Tea Party suggest 
that pressure will be placed on Republican candidates to accept positions further to the 
right of the median voter to maintain their positions (Abramowitz 2011).  Furthermore, 
this seems to be a continuation of previous work by Alan Abramowitz.  His studies found 
that ideological moderation by candidates can be a risky undertaking, as any move 
toward the center will risk alienating segments of their electoral base, which with the rise 
of the Tea Party is increasingly more conservative for the Republican side (Abramowitz 
2008).
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Roll Call Ideology
A roll call vote is basically any vote taken in Congress where the list of 
Congressmen, or “roll”, is read to determine attendance and vote status.  When talking 
about roll call voting in Congress, it is convenient to consider each member of Congress on 
the traditional ideological spectrum, liberal to conservative, in relation to other members 
of Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Poole and Rosenthal 2007).  This allows one to 
gauge a specific Congressman’s voting stance and to compare changes in voting pattern.  
The Tea Party is not a unique phenomenon in the history of the U.S., but it is the first 
factionalized movement in recent years and deserves some study as to its effects on 
ideology in Congress.  During the first half of the 112th Congress, research shows that 
there is little effect on the totality of Republican ideology scores, identified by Poole and 
Rosenthal’s NOMINATE scoring system (Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel 2012).  Poole and 
Rosenthal's system will be explained more fully later in this paper, as it is the primary 
analysis tool used to test the hypotheses.  That being said, little research has occurred on 
specific Congressman who faced a viable Tea Party candidate in either the primary 
election or the general election.  Bailey et. al. focused on possible nationwide ideological 
shifts, rather than focusing only on incumbents who faced Tea Party opposition or 
possible ideological shifts occurring due to the Tea Party’s strength in individual states.
For this reason, more research must be done on the individual level to assess possible Tea 
Party influence.  
Continuing with the idea of local Tea Party strength, research shows that on votes 
seemingly in line with Tea Party ideals, Republican members of Congress from districts 
with much Tea Party activity were more likely to vote in favor of what the Tea Party 
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favored (Bailey Mummolo, and Noel 2012). This adds weight to my hypothesis that non-
Tea Party Republicans may be affected by the strength of the movement in their own 
state.  Gallagher and Rock find that there is little difference in terms of roll call voting in 
the House between Republicans and self-identified Tea Party members, and propose as 
one of their answers to this conundrum that this is effectively because the Tea Party has 
“dragged the entire party to the right in a push for purity”(Gallagher and Rock 2012).  
They also concede, however, that this may be because there is little differentiation 
between Republicans and Tea Party Republicans.
When assessing the impact that the Tea Party has on individual Congressman, it is 
important again to realize the ultimate goal of incumbents.  If we assume that re-election 
is indeed the end goal of all elected officials, then we must look at how the voting public 
perceives issues important to themselves and how they relate those issues to a vote 
during election season.  Ignorance and imperfect information are both fundamental to 
human life and thus voting citizens do not always know which candidate will support the 
values that they believe to be important (Downs 1957).  
Research has shown that voters rely on party cues to decide whom to vote for in 
general elections.  Due to high information costs, they use these cues along with other 
candidate qualities to make more informed decisions in a world based on imperfect 
information (Conover and Feldman 1989; Kam 2005).  For the primary election, however, 
party cues are non-existent because each candidate is from the same party.  This is 
important because with the rise of the Tea Party movement, a new label was created for 
the average voter to engage with and learn about what policies were supported by 
individual candidates adhering to the Tea Party identifier.  This identifier may have acted 
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as a party cue for the 2010 primary elections, even though it was a more informal 
identifier than political party affiliation.  
More evidence for this idea of the Tea Party as an identifier to allow for easy voter 
cues comes from the Cooperative Congressional Election Study. This study measures 
voting consistency with regards to presidential approval and House voting.  The 2010 
study showed that 95% of those who identified with the Tea Party offered consistent 
responses based on their approval of President Obama, compared to 90% of Tea Party 
opponents and 79% of people who were neither supporters or opponents of the Tea Party 
(Jacobson 2011).  This goes to show that the Tea Party clearly aligns itself with a set 
political stance and rarely wavers, allowing for voters who align themselves with those 
specific ideals to know whom to vote for with ease.
The rise of the Tea Party label is an important indicator of “conservativeness,” and 
no alternative exists for the Democratic Party.  Many have written that the longevity of 
the Tea Party faction itself is going to be relatively short lived, largely due to the lack of 
organization and elected Tea Party official’s failure to stay true to the agenda that got 
them elected, specifically with the concept of earmarks in legislation.  The Tea Party 
Caucus, established by Representative Bachmann, had 38 of its 52 elected members 
request earmarks for their districts, a policy that the Tea Party Caucus strived to end 
when in office (Courser 2010).  This lack of unity within the movement brings a bleak
outlook for the Tea Party, but may offer an opening for other Republicans in future 
elections.
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Political Factions
The Tea Party movement is clearly a political faction and not an attempt to create 
an entirely new political party.  Duverger’s Law, one of the few ideas in the realm of 
political science that can be classified as a law due to just how basic and descriptive it is, 
explains that in an electoral system run by single member districts and first past the post 
voting, only two major parties will develop and last (Duverger 1955).  Because of this, the 
Tea Party would likely not be as influential had it attempted to organize collectively under 
a formal banner as it was in 2010 when under the guise of the Republican Party.  By 
remaining within the established party, the Tea Party could partake in primary elections 
and directly influence their results through the use of motivated ideologically extreme 
supporters.  Factions within parties rely on this established party structure to further 
their goals, but present a problem for the party on the whole.  Because these polarized 
factions are not wholly encompassed by the platform of the greater party, they may be 
consumed by other organizations.  To maintain their status as a dominant political force, 
traditional parties must realign to be in line with the polarized faction to ensure their 
support (Sundquist 1983). 
It is important to consider the impact of factions on Congress in general.  The rise 
of the Tea Party did not only change the face of the Republican Party, but impacted the 
entire Congressional system.  There were approximately nine intraparty factions in 
Congress throughout the 20th Century, each one striving to reach different goals (DiSalvo 
2009).  These factions can be categorized by whether or not they seek to preserve the 
status quo, or to change it.  Regardless of their categorization, ultimately when it comes to 
factions, the “…locus of power within the institution of Congress” is at stake (DiSalvo 
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2009).  This means shifting the focus of government to a strong centralized one, or a more 
decentralized one.  The Tea Party movement can be considered a faction striving to 
change the status quo simply through its platform encouraging lack of cooperation, and 
attempts to do so by establishing ties amongst its members and connecting them to 
outside organizations and groups.  It can be seen as trying to decentralize government 
through the promotion of fewer taxes and more economic freedom, utilizing policies 
devoid of compromise to achieve its goals.  The Tea Party faction within the Republican 
Party is much like previous factions like the Republican “Old Guard” in that it ideologically 
shifts the entirety of Congress around, affecting more than just their own party.
Uptake
When relating the presence of a Tea Party challenger to the roll call voting of a 
reelected incumbent, it is important to conceptualize just how this ideological shift would 
take place.  The concept of “issue uptake,” thoroughly discussed by Tracy Sulkin, is the 
idea that a victorious elected official will often subsume some of the policies and goals of 
their most competent adversary in the election (Sulkin 2005).  The reasoning behind this 
idea is simple and relates back to the Downsian principle that it is the goal of every 
politician to seek reelection.  If an elected official faces tough competition, it only makes 
sense that after obtaining victory, he attempts to increase his vote share in the district to 
avoid such a close contest in the next election cycle.  One of the ways that he can obtain 
voters who did not previously vote for him is to take up positions that his previous 
opponents, opponents who these voters supported, had as part of their platforms.  As 
Sulkin describes it: “Because challengers focus their campaigns on the incumbent’s 
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weaknesses, their choice of campaign themes provide signals to winning legislators about 
important issues they may have previously neglected” (Sulkin 2005, 2).  Because the Tea 
Party label was so prominent around the time of the 2010 midterm elections, and that 
label represented a certain sect of ideas, it is conceivable that other Republican 
candidates were more easily able to identify issue areas, like obsessive fiscal 
responsibility and reduction of the overall size of government, that they had previously 
neglected.
In the same vein, it is interesting to consider the possible “issue uptake” of 
Senatorial candidates.  Because of the six-year term length of a Senator, it is unlikely that 
those elected in 2010 that faced Tea Party opposition have adjusted their voting behavior 
as a direct result of the contest.  Instead it may be that, because incumbents do not simply 
wait for a challenger to come to light, but rather anticipate them in the future, that the 
class of incumbents up for reelection in 2012 may have adjusted its voting ideology in 
anticipation of meeting a Tea Party candidate in the party primary or general election.  
Senators going up for reelection in 2012 may have taken up some of the Tea Party 
ideologies preemptively in order to avoid a contentious party primary before the 2012 
election, much like the one that Senator Bennett from Utah experienced.
Because data are now available for the 112th Congress, it is possible to analyze if 
any uptake of ideas took place following the 2010 midterm elections, which would 
conceivably result in a larger proportion of the votes for the incumbent in the 2012 than 
2010.  This would lead to the end goal of all Representatives: getting reelected.  The Tea 
Party label will show to accelerate this idea of “issue uptake” because it allows voters to 
Stewartson 15
easily identify candidates with specific ideas.  A shift in roll call voting ideology would be 
indicative of “uptake” particularly on the Republican side of things.
Prior research done on the subject of the Tea Party effects on the ideology of other 
members of Congress have their various shortcomings that I build upon. Past research 
has identified that there was no significant shift overall in the first half of the 112th
Congress, but now that the data for the 2nd half is now available, it must be retested 
(Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel 2012).  Past research has also failed to conduct individual 
examinations of any ideological shift in Democratic or Republican members of Congress 
who faced a competitive Tea Party candidate.  My research will detail these specific cases 
to see if an encounter with a competitive candidate who identified with the Tea Party in 
the 2010 midterm elections resulted in an ideological shift towards a more liberal stance 
in Democrat incumbents. I look at Republicans to see if the Tea Party strength in their 
state affected their voting ideology mainly due to the small sample size of Republicans 
who faced, and beat, a Tea Party candidate in the primary election. This idea of the 
importance of statewide Tea Party strength on ideology is derived from possible future 
aspirations of an incumbent. If an incumbent has aspirations for statewide office like the 
Senate, he will focus on attaining voters in districts that may be more strongly associated 
with the Tea Party movement than his own is currently.
This paper generally focuses on how factions affect incumbent officials.  By testing 
the effect of the Tea Party movement and the subsequent Tea Party identifying label, I am 
able to detect possible ideological shifts that have occurred in specific Congressmen 
following their interactions with Tea Party candidates.  I believe that, due to the extreme 
ideological nature and insistence on a policy of no compromise, the Tea Party in the 2010 
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midterm elections resulted in the shifting to the right of Republican candidates and to the 
left of Democrat incumbents.  While competing uptake concerns may be an issue for the 
general election, for candidates who must focus on the primary election this is almost 
always true, because any attempts to seek the moderate middle will alienate a large 
segment of their electorate.  Additionally, preemptive uptake may have occurred for the 
Senate class going up for reelection in 2012 to avoid a difficult struggle to even be on the 
November ballot.
Research Design
It is my belief that the appearance of a Tea Party challenger in the 2010 midterm 
elections, whether in the primary or general elections, will push an incumbent more to 
one of the ideological extremes on the standard political ideology spectrum.  To test my 
proposed hypothesis, I examined individual electoral competitions in individual districts 
to see whether a competitive Tea Party challenger was present against Democratic 
candidates in the general election. Additionally, I looked at the strength of the Tea Party 
movement in individual states and its effect on Republican incumbents' roll call ideology.
After districts with competitive Tea Party candidates in the 2010 midterm elections 
became defined, I examined ideological spectrum scores based on the DW-NOMINATE 
analysis system created by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal.
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DW-NOMINATE
DW-NOMINATE is a tool that ranks current and past members of Congress on an 
ideological liberal-conservative spectrum based on their performances in roll call voting.
The system differentiates Congressmen based on party affiliation, assigning red and blue 
colors to the labels of each member.  What is most helpful about this system is that not 
only does it separate Congressmen based on party affiliation, but can also be used to 
differentiate Representatives based on minute ideological differences.  DW-NOMINATE 
analyzes each vote in Congress to determine positioning on the liberal-conservative 
spectrum, delineating differences between Congressmen with seemingly identical voting 
patterns.  Because this system has records going back all the way to the 1st Congress, one 
is able to clearly identify an incumbent’s first dimension score.  This dimension score is a 
measure of ideology from -1 (extremely liberal) to 1 (extremely conservative) used to 
examine any change that happened between the score for the 111th Congress and that of 
the 112th Congress, which occurred after the induction of the Tea Party movement.  While 
this system is useful to identify changes in ideological positioning over time, it is 
impossible to determine the direct cause of this change.
Identification of Tea Party candidates
There are several important factors that come into play when discussing who
exactly can be identified as a Tea Party candidate.  Since the creation of the Tea Party 
Caucus, many other organizations such as the Boston Tea Party have sprouted up, 
including Contract From America, the Tea Party Express, and Freedom Works.  All of 
these organizations endorse candidates that may allude to membership in the Tea Party 
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faction. Sarah Palin has become one of the more influential members of the Tea Party, 
and her endorsements also signal a membership to the Republican faction.  Additionally, 
self-identification as a candidate supporting the ideals of the Tea Party can be an 
identifier as membership, but it may be the case that some candidates chose to be a 
member only by name and not by policy in order to ride the momentum of the movement.  
Because of this, more than self-identification as a Tea Party Republican is necessary for 
this study.
Variables
Two main variables are important to this study.  The independent variable is 
simply the binary attribute of being confronted with Tea Party opposition or not.  
Accordingly, the dependent variable is the shifting in ideology based on the liberal-
conservative ideological spectrum.  This ideological positioning, as defined by the DW-
DW-NOMINATE system, is based on roll call voting in Congress. thus, there are many 
conflicting factors that must be controlled to be able to look at the effect Tea Party 
opposition may have had on ideology.  First of all, party affiliation traditionally assumes 
that a Congressman will reside in one general area of the ideological spectrum; 
Republicans will be typically more conservative, while Democrats will be more liberal.  If 
a very conservative Republican incumbent represents a state that has a strong Tea Party 
presence, he may not shift to a more conservative stance, as he may have already been to 
the right of the general Tea Party.  Congressional districts are subject to change at 
different time intervals based on the jurisdiction of each individual state, but shifting 
district boundaries may also shift the ideological mean of a district.  If a district moves 
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toward a more conservative population, an incumbent may shift his roll call voting 
ideology toward the right as a result. This shift would be completely devoid of any 
influence from the contest with a member of the Tea Party. In this study, however, 
congressional district lines were not changed during the 111th or the 112th Congress, 
effectively making this concept moot.
It is important to look at the qualities of a Congressman that lead to a certain 
ideological stance, or a shift in his current one.  While party affiliation is by far the most 
important aspect, contributing factors are numerous, including possibly seniority in 
Congress or  the amount of funds  that a candidate raised during a particular election 
cycle.  Seniority may lead to more personal changes in voting pattern based on an 
individual Representative’s age.  Additionally, a Representative’s seniority impacts his 
DW-NOMINATE score, with the longer he has served in Congress, the smaller the change 
between one Congress and the next should be. This may result in the under-reporting of 
the effect of the Tea Party on change in ideology, and thus must be controlled.  In today’s 
election climate, money is key and if an incumbent is experiencing a shortage of it, he may 
change his voting patterns to match the audience that he wishes to target for financial 
donations.  Because of this, campaign contributions during the 2010 election cycle are
also controlled for each data analysis in this paper.
Data
The data for the testing of these hypotheses are derived from individual 
examinations of incumbents who faced competitive Tea Party opposition in either the 
primary or general election during the 2010 midterm election cycle. In addition to 
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looking at incumbents who faced Tea Party opposition and the change in ideology that 
occurred, I observed the ideological stances of Representatives who did not face Tea Party 
opposition directly, but who were elected from a state that experienced Tea Party 
pressures in other districts. By analyzing the change in ideological stance with regards to 
DW-NOMINATE and a metric created to measure Tea Party strength in individual states, I 
was  able to investigate possible changes in ideology based on intrastate pressures.  This 
metric looks at the number of competitive Tea Party candidates in primary elections 
across the state, and divides that by the total number of competitive candidates.  If a Tea 
Party candidate beat the incumbent in the primary election, the score was be doubled to 
emphasize the obviously increased strength of the movement in that state. To be 
considered a competitive member of the Tea Party, a candidate must be endorsed by the 
Tea Party organizations, Contract For America, Tea Party Express, or Sarah Palin.  In
addition to these endorsements, a candidate must receive more than 10% of the vote in 
any given primary or general election.
Comparison
Now that I have determined the data set of applicable Congressmen, a statistical 
comparison can be made between the 111th Congress first dimension ideology score in 
DW-NOMINATE and the 112th Congress first dimension ideology score. For my 
hypotheses to be confirmed, I expect the 111th Congress score to be lower than the 112th
Congress score for Republican incumbents, which indicates a shift towards a more 
conservative voting pattern on roll call votes.  I also expect Democrats who face Tea Party 
opposition to have a higher 111th Congress score when compared to the 112th Congress 
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due to fewer restrictions on voting moderation as a result of facing a more extreme 
candidate.  I expect that Republican Senators up for reelection in 2012 from states with a 
higher Tea Party strength index will become more conservative as a precautionary 
measure, and that Democrat Senators in the same position will become more liberal due 
to the effects of extremist oppositional forces in their state.
Data Analysis
First I looked at the effects of going against a Tea Party challenger on Democrat 
incumbents.  Without taking anything else into consideration, I wanted to see if a 
comparison of the means would show anything of value when comparing Democrat 
incumbents who did and did not face challengers endorsed by Tea Party organizations.
Table 1:
Group Observations Mean Std. Error Std. 
Deviation
95% Confidence
Not Against TP 68 -0.0006471 0.0016634 0.0137165 -0.0039672 to 0.002673
Against TP 81 -0.0030741 0.0013111 0.0118002 -0.0056833 to -0.0004648
Combined 149 -0.0019664 0.0020904 -0.0017041 to 0.0065581
The simple t-test in Table 1 indicates that, upon comparing the means of Democrat 
incumbents who faced Tea Party opposition and those who did not, facing a candidate 
associated with the movement may have a negative effect on voting ideology. Each of the 
boundaries of the 95% confidence interval for incumbents facing Tea Party candidates are 
less than 0, implying that this average mean is statistically significant when a	= .05. That 
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being said, correlation does not imply causation and thus other steps must be taken in 
order to control for various other factors impacting incumbent Congressmen. Table 2 is a 
regression that is taken with the ideological change in an incumbent’s roll call voting as 
the dependent variable, with the binomial of facing a Tea Party candidate or not, 
closeness of the election by percentage of votes, seniority, and amount of campaign 
finances raised during the election cycle as the independent variables.
Table 2:
Change in Ideology Coefficient Std. Error t value P > |t| 95% Confidence 
Presence of Tea Party 
Challenger
-0.0001772 0.0022077 -0.08 0.936 -0.0045408 to 0.0041864
Closeness of Election 0.0001792 0.0000571 3.14 0.002** 0.0000663 to 0.000292
Seniority 6.07e-6 8.82e-6 0.69 0.493 -0.0000114 to 0.0000235
Campaign Contributions 1.55e-9 1.48e-9 1.07 0.288 -1.32e-9 to 4.43e-9
Constant -0.0106458 0.0042934 -2.48 0.014* -0.019132 to -0.0021596
* = Significance at the p < .05 level
** = Significance at the p < .005 level
Unfortunately, this regression seems to indicate that the presence of a Tea Party 
challenger does not affect a Democrat member of Congress in a statistically significant 
way.  It leans to a negative effect, but that cannot be said with any statistical certainty.  
Additionally, the concepts of seniority and campaign finances for the 2010 election cycle 
do not seem to affect ideology in any significant way.  What is interesting, however, is the 
strength that the closeness of the general election has on an individual Representative’s 
roll call voting ideology.  The data shows a positive relationship between the closeness of 
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an election and the change in ideological roll call voting.  This indicates that if an election 
was a landslide, a Democrat Representative may be more likely to make their roll call 
voting ideology significantly more liberal than their counterparts who experienced close 
elections.  This study looks at 81 Democrat incumbents with Tea Party endorsed 
opposition and 68 without.  A closer look at this data is clearly necessary to see how the 
presence of the Tea Party could have impacted voting records.  
The group of 68 incumbents who did not face competition from Tea Party 
opponents had an average margin of victory of 38.94%.  The remaining 81 only had an 
average margin of victory of 23.94%.  Because these two groups are so different, it is 
prudent to separate them to examine them individually to see if the statistical significance 
of the closeness of the election persists.
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Table 3:  Positive for Tea Party Presence
Change in Ideology Coefficient Std. Error t value p > |t| 95% Confidence
Closeness of Election 0.0001901 0.0000859 2.21 0.030* 0.000019 to 0.0003611
Seniority 0.0000189 0.0000103 1.84 0.069 -1.51e-6 to .0000394
Campaign Contributions 3.83e-9 1.74e-9 2.20 0.031* 3.58e-10 to 7.30e-9
Constant -0.0168822 0.0049047 -3.44 0.001** -0.0266488 to -0.0071157
* = Significance at the p < .05 level
** = Significance at the p < .005 level
Table 4:  Negative for Tea Party Presence
Change in Ideology Coefficient Std. Error t value p > |t| 95% Confidence
Closeness of Election 0.0001549 0.0000764 2.03 0.047* 2.28e-6 to 0.0003076
Seniority -0.0000169 0.0000153 -1.10 0.274 -0.0000474 to 0.0000137
Campaign Contributions -2.28e-9 2.45e-9 -0.93 0.355 -7.17e-9 to 2.61e-9
Constant -0.0007223 0.0063857 -0.11 0.910 -.00134792 to 0.0120345
* = Significance at the p < .05 level
** = Significance at the p < .005 level
When the two groups of Democrats are separated, the regressions indicate that the 
positive relationship between closeness of election and change in ideology is greater for 
incumbents who faced Tea Party opposition.  The reverse then is true for Democrats who 
faced non-Tea Party endorsed opponents.  This supports my hypothesis that incumbents 
who face more extreme candidates may move further to one end of the spectrum
themselves.  The idea behind this resides in the idea of the median voter, which the 
incumbent could still target with more extreme ideological viewpoints.
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Table 5:  Close Democrat Elections
Difference in Ideology Coefficient Std. Error t value p > |t| 95% Confidence
Presence of Tea Party Challenger 0.0086588 0.0079049 1.10 0.283 -0.00759 to 0.0249075
Closeness of Election -0.0004057 0.0009217 -0.44 0.663 -0.0023004 to 0.0014889
Seniority 0.0000356 0.000028 1.27 0.215 -0.000022 to 0.0000932
Campaign Contributions -3.37e-9 4.28e-9 -0.79 0.437 -1.22e-8 to 5.42e-9
Constant -0.0119896 0.0157487 -0.76 0.453 -0.0443616 to 0.0203824
* = Significance at the p < .05 level
** = Significance at the p < .005 level
Table 5 shows that when certain incumbents were eliminated (those who won 
their elections by more than 12%), a set of Democrats was established to more 
specifically test the effects of the presence of a Tea Party candidate and the closeness of 
an election.  The presence of a Tea Party challenger still has a positive effect on changes in 
voting ideology, but with a p-value of 0.273.  This value is much lower than the p-value 
when the entire group of Democrats was tested, but is far from significant. Additionally, 
when the set of Democrats who had a close election is examined, the effects of the 
closeness of elections do not affect change in voting ideology in the same way.  This is 
most likely due to the fact that all of the incumbents at this point are bunched around the 
same data points and become hard to distinguish, unlike when there are elections that 
were landslides thrown in the mix.
I originally intended the purpose of this paper to be examining the effects of 
beating a Tea Party endorsed candidate on incumbent Republicans’ roll call voting 
ideology.  The main difficulty I had with that goal was the incredibly small sample size 
that would make any finding statistically insignificant.  Because of this, I was forced to 
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adapt my hypothesis to look at the effects of the Tea Party on Republicans who were not 
endorsed or affiliated with the Tea Party.  Using my metric that gauges the strength of the 
Tea Party movement in individual states, I was able to see whether the presence of a 
stronger factional base in a state would influence Representatives who did not face a 
specific Tea Party challenger in their district.  One major drawback with this method was 
that the metric I employed may overstate the strength of the movement in smaller states, 
where the total number of primary candidates is undoubtedly lower. That being said, the 
methodology is sufficient for the majority of the cases in this study.
Table 6:
Change in Ideology Coefficient Std. Error t value p > |t| 95% Confidence
Tea Party Strength 0.0216833 0.0241911 0.90 0.372 -0.0262175 to 0.0695842
Campaign Contributions 2.37e-10 2.22e-9 0.11 0.915 -.417e-9 to 4.64e-9
Seniority -0.0000506 0.0000216 -2.34 0.021* -0.0000933 to -7.82e-6
Constant 0.0159918 0.0076198 2.10 0.038* 0.0009038 to 0.0310797
* = Significance at the p < .05 level
** = Significance at the p < .005 level
The data in Table 6 show that, while Tea Party strength may have a positive effect 
on voting ideology and consequentially makes Republicans more conservative, that trend 
cannot be stated with scientific certainty.  This may be possible with a larger sample size, 
but due to the nature of the United States legislature, is difficult without more years of 
data.  It is interesting to denote, however, that seniority appears to be a significant 
influence on roll call ideology, which was not evident in the datasets involving only 
Democrat Representatives.  Because this relationship is a be negative one, the data set 
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implies that the less time a Republican member of Congress has been in office, the less 
conservative his change in ideology will be.
This paper mainly focuses on the effects of the Tea Party on the House of 
Representatives.  The short, two-year terms that require each incumbent to be up for re-
election each cycle allow for a glimpse at exactly how the rise of the faction within the 
Republican Party caused a shift in politics in such a short time.  The United States Senate 
is a curious matter when talking about the Tea Party.  Because Senators have six-year 
terms, they are quite probably less influenced by bursts of factional activity within 
parties.  That being said, it is worthwhile to look at Senators who were up for reelection in 
2012 to examine their changing ideology in order to take note if any preemptive shifts 
that may have occurred due to the rise of the Tea Party.
Table 7:  Senators Up for Election in 2012
Change in Ideology Coefficient Std. Error t value p > |t| 95% Confidence
Tea Party Strength 0.0098277 0.0110262 0.89 0.387 -.00136741 to 0.0333295
Campaign Contributions 3.39e-10 2.93e-10 1.16 0.266 -2.86e-10 to 9.63e-10
Seniority 0.0000242 0.0000872 0.28 0.786 -0.0001617 to 0.00021
Constant -0.0068469 0.0053043 -1.29 0.216 -0.0181527 to 0.004459
* = Significance at the p < .05 level
** = Significance at the p < .005 level
This examination of Senatorial data says little for my study.  With only 19 
observations of Senators who did not retire, were up for reelection, and won their 
reelection bids, the sample size is incredibly small.  Additionally, there were only 4 
Republican Senators who fit the criteria set forth in this data set, making any analysis 
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based on party lines in the Senate fruitless.  Though it was insignificant at any important 
level, Tea Party strength in a state may have a positive relationship with change in voting 
ideology, pushing both Democrats and Republicans further to the two poles of the 
ideological spectrum. It would be interesting to look at more Senators to see how the 
movement would affect members of Congress with six-year terms as opposed to two-year 
terms if the Tea Party were to persist at a fervent level for a few more election cycles.
Conclusion
The Tea Party movement, leading up to the 2010 midterm elections, was the most 
recent example of a faction rising within an individual party.  This concept of a different 
identifiable sect inside an already established political party creates numerous topics to 
study.  Voters in this instance were allowed easy access to information based on the Tea 
Party label alone, where no label existed prior. The candidates who embraced this label 
immediately made their position on certain key issues, such as taxation and compromise 
within the legislature known to all based entirely off of label recognition to the generally 
uninformed public.  The creation of this label worked as a cue to identify specific types of 
Republican Representatives, which in turn started an attempt to spin the locus of power 
in Congress.  Because of this, members of Congress on each side of the aisle were forced to 
shift their voting ideologies to better target the median voter in their district, to secure 
the ultimate goal of a Representative: reelection. Understanding why Representatives 
vote the way that they do is one of the most important studies in political science purely 
because of how important many of their decisions are.  By analyzing the effect that the 
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Tea Party has had on incumbent legislators, we can better see how extreme party factions 
influence Congress in its entirety.
Analyzing the effect that the Tea Party had on Senators up for reelection in 2012 
was quite difficult.  It is challenging to single out variables that could influence a change in 
ideology based on such a small sample size, especially with that sample size being so 
skewed in the direction of Democratic Senators.  Despite this fact, the regressions ran on 
the data available show that the strength of the Tea Party movement in individual states 
might have had a positive effect on change in voting ideology.  This is what would have 
been expected with the hypothesis I had originally put forth.  Because of the extreme 
nature of the Tea Party movement, Senators up for reelection may have preemptively 
adjusted their voting behavior in a more extreme direction themselves.  In the case of 
Republicans, to combat possible Tea Party opposition for their reelection bid, and in the 
case of Democrats to achieve an apparent reverse uptake due to the polarizing nature of 
the movement.  
Relatively in the same vein as the data analyses involving Senators, I had difficulty
pinning down any statistical significance with regards to the Tea Party movement’s effect 
on Republican ideological changes.  The data indicated that there was a positive 
correlation between the strength of the movement in an individual state and change in 
Republican ideology, but again it was distant from any level of certainty.  If the Tea Party 
remains in its current state for several more terms in Congress, a more thorough analysis 
could be done in the future with a larger sample size of Republican Representatives to 
look at.  Interestingly enough, my analysis of 122 Republicans did show that seniority in 
the House of Representatives was a statistically significant factor in determining change 
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in ideological stance.  This was not present in the datasets involving solely Democrat 
Congressmen.  Whether this phenomenon is unique to the Republican Party based on 
something inherent in its structure or is just an anomaly from this specific set of 
regressions is an interesting topic to consider.
The most significant information that I was able to gather from this research came 
from the Democrat side.  I looked at 81 Representatives who faced opposition from Tea 
Party endorsed candidates, and 69 who did not.  When the entire sample was combined 
and analyzed, there was a clear and statistically significant relationship between the 
closeness of an election and a movement along the ideological scale.  This alone did not 
tell much about the influence of the Tea Party, so I broke the group of Democrats down 
into groups based on the binomial variable of Tea Party presence.  Both groups of 
Democrats displayed a statistically significant positive relationship between the closeness 
of an election and a change in ideology, but the group positive for Tea Party presence had 
a relatively larger one.  This suggests that the closeness of an election resulted in a larger 
change in ideology for Democrats who went against Tea Party endorsed candidates than 
their peers who did not face movement endorsed challengers.  Because of the extremist 
nature of the Tea Party, a successful reelection bid against one of its members may signal 
that a Democrat Representative is free to move more ideologically liberal while still 
feeling electorally secure.
Ultimately, the Tea Party movement is relatively banal.  It is not the first intraparty 
faction to rise in the United States Congress, and in fact there were nine incidences of 
similar factions throughout the last century.  The Tea Party will not be a prevalent group 
forever and neither will the effects it has had on Congress over the last couple of years.  
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What I found most interesting to study when dealing with the Tea Party is the idea of 
factions and how they affect various members of Congress on both sides of the aisle.  
From this study, it can be seen that the Tea Party has been steadily pushing both sides of 
the political spectrum to their respective poles.  The Tea Party started this by forcing the 
Republican Party to adapt to its platform in order to keep them within the Republican 
banner.  The Democratic Party simply followed the end goal of all politicians and 
maximized their median voter, which due to the extremist nature of the Tea Party, was 
increasingly easily attained with more liberal stances. Through simple analyses of the 
most recent factional movement within the U.S. Congress, the nature of politics can be 
seen in its current state.
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